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Abstract: Party membership and social networks, as two forms of nonmarket power, 
have significant effects on personal income. Do the effects vary across different 
ownership sectors (suoyouzhi xingzhi)? Using a nationally representative survey of 
urban households (China Household Income Project surveys in 1995 and 2002), we 
find that (1) party membership can significantly increase personal income, but this 
effect does not significantly differ between different ownership sectors or between the 
years 1995 and 2002 and (2) social networks are insignificant in State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), while they contribute significantly to personal income in non-
SOE sectors. 
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  11. Introduction 
In recent years, interest among economists in studying the effects of nonmarket power (e.g., 
personality, social networks) on personal income has grown. However, the relationship 
between nonmarket power and the market system is still unclear. It is possible that nonmarket 
forces could either be replaced by the market system during its formation and development, or 
lie embedded in the market mechanism with the result of an enhanced return to nonmarket 
forces caused by marketization. Market reforms in China, and especially the various degrees 
of marketization in different ownership sectors (suoyouzhi xingzhi), provide a rare opportunity 
to investigate the relationship between market and nonmarket power. In this paper, there are 
two types of nonmarket power. One is membership of the Chinese Communist Party, the 
Chinese variant of political status. The other is social network, which has been extensively 
discussed in the literature. In modern China, as a result of the hierarchical political and social 
structure and the differences caused by individual political status and social networks, these 
nonmarket factors have become important determinants of personal earnings, including 
invisible and gray income (e.g., Bian, 1994; Lee, 1998; Knight and Yueh, 2002; Appleton et 
al., 2005). Nevertheless, little research has explored the relationship between marketization 
and the effects of the two nonmarket forces. During the process of gradual economic reform, 
the power nurtured by nonmarket factors has not been eliminated by marketization. Instead, 
those who hold the power could probably realize its value by manipulating the new market 
system. China’s marketization can be better understood if we know the returns to nonmarket 
forces. 
Based on a nationally representative cross-sectional survey of Chinese urban 
households conducted by the China Household Income Project (CHIP) for two reference 
years, 1995 and 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the 1995 and 2002 CHIP surveys), we probe 
the impacts of Party membership and social networks on urban residents’ incomes in different 
ownership sectors. Our results show that Party membership contributes significantly to 
  2individual earnings, but this effect does not differ by sector, or between 1995 and 2002. 
Meanwhile, the benefit of social networks on earned income does depend on the ownership 
sector. Social networks are insignificant in state-owned units, where the level of marketization 
is relatively low, but brings substantial income premiums in market-oriented parts of the labor 
market. If marketization proceeds over time and non-SOE sectors are more subject to market 
forces than their SOE counterparts, then our paper provides empirical evidence that 
marketization does not necessarily weaken the influences of nonmarket forces. Instead, the 
rewards for nonmarket power could possibly be realized in monetary terms because the new 
market mechanism contains many nonmarket factors. 
These findings can help us forecast the pathway of China’s future marketization. If 
social networks are more important in market-oriented sectors during China’s economic 
transition, then in order to pursue further gains in income, people with a wide social network 
will reinvest in social capital to continue to increase their income premium. This might lead to 
a decline in China’s income mobility, as suggested by the existing literature (Wang, 2005; Yin 
et al., 2006). Thus, this is a reminder not to be too optimistic about China’s current high 
income mobility and that the future effects of intergenerational transmission of social 
networks, as well as education, should be considered when investigating income inequality in 
China in the long-run.
1 If the establishment of the market system is accompanied by an 
expanding social network, the impact of such marketization on China’s future development is 
something well worth studying. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature, 
and point out its potential problems and our contribution. Section 3 describes the data. Section 
4 presents and interprets the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
                                                           
1 Previous studies have found that income mobility in postreform China has been significantly higher than in 
Western countries such as the US, Germany and Belgium. (Khor and Pencavel, 2005; Ding and Wang, 2005). 
  32.  Literature Review 
2.1 Communist Party Membership 
The role played by Communist Party membership in the labor market has provoked much 
controversy in the literature. Two studies examine Chinese Communist Party membership as a 
form of political capital using CHIP surveys. Knight and Yueh (2002), based on another CHIP 
survey focusing on urban households for 1999, studied the economic importance of individual 
Party membership in urban labor markets. They found that Party membership could enhance 
personal income. As a by-product of the research, they categorized the whole sample 
according to ownership sector and age cohort, respectively, and then compared the 
coefficients on Party membership. They discovered that market-oriented sectors have higher 
rewards for Party membership than the nonmarket sector, as does the youngest cohort in 
comparison with its oldest counterpart. Therefore, they suggest that Party membership would 
have an increasing influence on personal earnings because the younger group would be more 
subject to market forces and, in addition, the private sector would expand with marketization.  
Although interesting, the reason for their finding still needs further investigation. First, 
if we want to test whether the partial effects of Party membership differ significantly by 
ownership sector, it might be advisable to establish interactions between Party membership 
and ownership sector and age cohort, respectively, based on the overall sample. If the 
interaction term is significant, it indicates there is indeed significant difference between 
ownership sectors or age cohorts in returns to Party membership. In our paper, we introduce 
interaction terms in the econometric model, which are found to be insignificant. Second, they 
found Party membership was more important for younger relative to older groups, but it is 
still uncertain whether this stems from the enhanced benefits of Party membership from 
marketization. Sato and Eto (2008), using the 2002 CHIP survey, found that younger Party 
members tended to have more years of schooling than their older predecessors, thus it might 
be possible that the higher income premium in the younger cohort actually reflects the 
  4increasing return to education during marketization, which is confirmed later in our paper. 
Appleton  et al. (2005), using the 1995 and 2002 CHIP data as well as the CHIP 
surveys for 1988 and 1999, found the premium to Party membership in 2002 smaller than that 
in 1999. They argued that, because of the changing composition of Party membership, new 
entrants might have unobserved characteristics that tend to be less productivity-enhancing, 
which resulted in a declined return to Party membership. However, their differences of 
coefficients on Party membership in these years were statistically insignificant. Again, it is 
better to integrate the data for all years and establish interaction terms for Party membership 
and the year dummy. If the interaction term is significantly negative, it demonstrates that the 
impact of Party membership on earnings is indeed decreasing significantly over time. In our 
paper, based on the pooled cross-sectional data set for 1995 and 2002, we constructed an 
econometric model with the interaction term between Party membership and the year dummy, 
only to find that the income premium does not differ between the two years. 
Li  et al. (2005a) showed that much of the economic return to Party membership 
resulted from the effects of omitted ability or family background variables. By employing a 
within-twin-pair fixed-effects model to control these omitted variables, they found that the 
effect of Party membership in ordinary least-squares estimates all but disappeared. In addition, 
considering the strict Party membership selection process, they conclude that the premium to 
Party membership was mainly attributed to unobserved ability or family background. In fact, 
there are some limits to the use of the within-twin-pair fixed-effects model to control 
unobserved variables. First, some unobserved qualities, which are cultivated via nurture and 
might vary even within a pair of twins, are difficult to control through the first difference 
approach. Second, given the possible preference of the parents, the family environment might 
not be exactly the same for each twin. Third, if the return to Party membership also depends 
on another variable (e.g., ownership sector of the work unit), which differs between the twins, 
then the first difference cannot completely control the unobserved factor either. 
  5Is there a more direct approach to studying the return to Party membership over the 
period of the marketization process? Does Party membership represent individual ability or 
political capital? Li et al. (2005a) thought it largely indicated omitted ability. Their argument 
is that China’s market reform started with a planned economy characterized by depressed 
returns to human capital. With the progress of market reform, ability as measured by Party 
membership, which is supposed to accord with education, would be rewarded more in market-
oriented sectors. In our paper, we add the interaction term between Party membership and 
ownership sector in the income function as well as that of Party membership and year dummy, 
using pooled cross-sectional data for 1995 and 2002. If our empirical results showed that both 
education and Party membership had higher rewards in non-SOE sectors or in the more recent 
year, then Party membership is probably an indicator of either ability or political capital, and 
they would both generate a higher income premium during market reform. However, our 
findings suggest that education is more valuable in market-driven sectors and in 2002, as 
expected, while there is no significant difference between returns to Party membership in 
these comparison groups. Therefore, it is likely that Party membership reflects both ability 
and political capital, and when market reform enhances the return to unobserved ability, it 
reduces that of political capital. 
 
2.2 Social Networks 
As an informal institution, social networks contribute a great deal to economic development, 
as has been verified in the literature. In the labor market, social networks have positive effects 
on individual earnings in many countries (e.g., Granovetter, 1995[1974]; Waldinger, 1996; 
Bartlett and Miller, 1985; Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994), and China is no exception (Bian, 
1994; Lee, 1998). Furthermore, there is growing interest in the relationship between social 
networks and formal institutions. Can social networks be embedded in formal institutions and 
thus play a more important role, or be weakened by market forces during economic transition? 
  6Sociologists have explored the relationship between market transition and social stratification, 
focusing on whether the redistributive economy-based stratification mechanisms still 
predominate during market transition.
2 “The power transition theory” (Szelenyi, 1978; Nee, 
1991, 1996) holds that traditional power might transit to the market during market reform, 
hence the redistributive economy-based stratification mechanisms and traditional elites would 
decline, and new stratification mechanisms and elites would be nurtured by the market. In 
contrast, “The power persistence theory” believes that redistributive economy-based power 
still functions during marketization, thus the traditional elites continue to dominate based on 
stratification mechanisms. Zhang et al.（2007）studied whether the effects of social capital, 
including social networks and public trust, changed with marketization, and found that 
generally the return to social capital (especially the social network of the household) declined 
with marketization. With the focus on rural poverty, their research used data from rural areas, 
providing another piece of evidence about the influence of China’s marketization on the 
returns to social capital. However, it might not reflect the whole reality of economic transition.  
In our paper, we investigate the returns to social networks in Chinese urban labor 
markets and their possible change during marketization, which is the background in our paper. 
Based on data from urban China, our research probes differences between the benefits of 
social networks by ownership sector. Knight and Yueh (2002) found that social networks 
contributed to individual earnings in urban labor markets. Additionally, they divided the entire 
sample by ownership sector, and discovered that social networks paid more in privately 
owned sectors than in the state-owned sector. In our paper, we construct the interaction term 
between social network and the ownership sector to test whether there are significant 
differences in the returns to social networks by ownership sector. 
If we confirm the impact of Party membership and social networks on earnings, we 
                                                           
2 In sociology, redistributive economy refers to the nonmarket trade dominated by national political power, and it 
mainly studies the system of redistribution under socialism. On the other hand, market economy is interpreted as 
free transactions based on the price mechanism in the market (Szelenyi, 1978). Here we follow the sociological 
literature since redistributive economy and market system are comparable terms. 
  7still need to explore their mechanisms, hence it is especially important to study the changing 
roles of Party membership and social networks during market reform. In modern China’s 
hierarchical political and social structure, political status and social capital normally 
symbolize power and can promote higher incomes. During the economic transition, we will 
investigate whether returns to power are influenced by market forces. If marketization results 
in a normative market system, then the rewards for political and social capital will decline, 
and it might be less likely that people with power can pursue higher earnings and thus gain 
more power. However, if the conventional political and social structure has entrenched itself 
within the newly-born market system, then the market rules might be dominated by people 
with power, and political and social capital will be transformed into market power owned by 
individuals. In this case, it is reasonable to expect that the returns to political and social 
capital will be enhanced rather than depressed by marketization, which might make it difficult 
to maintain China’s high income mobility. 
Our paper makes the following contributions that build upon previous literature. First, 
it is the first formal study of the impacts of marketization, political status and social networks 
on personal income by interacting ownership sector with political status and social networks, 
respectively. Second, through interaction terms between social capital and ownership sectors, 
it explores different effects of social capital in ownership sectors, which have different 
degrees of marketization. These findings can help us understand what Party membership and 
social capital really represent, and, more importantly, the nature of China’s market economy 
and the future pathway to its economic transition. 
 
3.  Data 
The data set we use is the China Household Income Project (CHIP) Survey conducted by the 
Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Science and National Bureau of Statistics 
in February 2003. The reference year is 2002. The sample size is 6835 urban households and 
  820,632 individuals, covering 12 provinces and 70 cities.
3 The provinces are Beijing, Shanxi, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yuannan and 
Gansu. Since our research concentrates on employed persons, our sample actually includes 
information on 9998 individuals in the above 12 provinces in 2002. 
Meanwhile, for comparison purposes, we also employ data from 1995. These data are 
also from CHIP in 1995. The sample size is 6934 urban households and 21,696 individuals, 
and covers 11 provinces and 69 cities. The provinces are Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, 
Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Yuannan and Gansu. Again, given the focus on 
employed individuals, our sample includes information on 12,290 persons in the 11 provinces 
in 1995. 
Table 1 here 
First, we concentrate on information about Party membership. Table 1 is the statistical 
description of our samples in 2002 and 1995. We summarize the ratios of Party membership 
in different ownership sectors as well as income comparison between Party members and non-
Party members. The latter is measured by the difference between the mean income of Party 
members and non-Party members in all ownership sectors. In 2002, Party members accounted 
for 28.58% of the total, an increase of 3.94% over 1995. All ownership sectors experienced 
various rises in their percentage of Party membership. However, in both 2002 and 1995, the 
state-owned sector had the highest ratio, which is consistent with direct observation. Party 
members also earned more than their counterparts on average, and this income gap is 
significantly positive. We need to point out that in 1995 the private sector had only one Party 
member with an annual income of 3840 and 46 non-Party members with an average annual 
income of 6864.30. It is possible that the mean income for non-Party members is higher than 
its counterpart because of the small sample size. 
Second, we need to find an appropriate operational measure of social capital at the 
individual level. Burt (1992) holds that size and density are the two typical measures of an 
                                                           
3 For a detailed description of the CHIP 2002 and 1995 data, see Gustafsson, Li and Sicular (2008). 
  9individual’s social network. The former refers to the number of contacts in the network and the 
latter their interrelatedness. For example, an individual might have a number of contacts who 
know each other. His or her network is denser and smaller than another individual’s network in 
which few contacts know each other. Our measure of social capital is the reported number of 
relatives or friends an individual can ask for help to change his/her job. In urban labor markets, 
the number of contacts a person can approach for help in job switching is strongly correlated 
with the quality of resources and information he/she can use to increase earning power. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics about social capital and related variables based on 
2002 data.
4 We see that the mean size of social capital for an employed individual is around 
unity. To understand the significance of social capital, we divide each ownership sector 
subsample into two groups, those above the sector mean social capital and those below that 
mean. We then calculate the mean income difference between the two groups and test its 
significance. We find that the differences are significantly positive in all ownership sectors, 
with Others, Self-employed and Foreign and joint venture sectors among the top three. 
Table 2 here 
In some literature, Party membership is regarded as a type of social capital (e.g., 
Knight and Yueh, 2002), but we disagree for two reasons. First, social capital is based on 
social interaction, while Party membership is a form of political resource under China’s 
unique political system. Second, using the 2002 sample, our correlation analysis of social 
networks and Party membership revealed a correlation coefficient of only 0.0442. Therefore, 
we can exclude the possibility that using Party membership and social networks 
simultaneously in the model might cause serious collinearity. It also indicates that Party 




                                                           
4 There is no related information about social networks in the data of 1995. 
5 It should be noted that, because of data limitations, we do not consider differences in social network quality. It 
is quite possible that party members are more likely to have contact with more influential people. 
  104.  Empirical Investigation 
4.1 Differences between Ownership Sectors in Returns to Party Membership 
First, we follow Knight and Yueh (2002) to study how Party membership influences income. 
Using the 2002 data, we partitioned the sample by ownership sector and then compared the 
coefficients on Party membership. The income function is as follows. 
01 2 3 4 5 ln ii i i i i i YX C P O C I C i u α ββ β β β =+ + + + + +   
      (1) 
In Equation (1), the dependent variable is the log of individual annual income, which we 
choose for two reasons. First, total annual income can estimate a person’s earnings more 
precisely than their wage. Since the income brought by political status and social network 
may not be necessarily transformed into wage growth, it is more appropriate to take total 
annual income as our dependent variable. Second, we tried the log of hourly income as an 
alternative dependent variable, but found no notable difference between the two indicators. 
Based on previous literature (Knight and Yueh, 2002; Appleton et al., 2005), we employ the 
following independent variables. 
 
1.  Individual characteristics  i X . It encompasses a set of variables: gender, education, age 
and its square, a marital status dummy (base group is single), other Party member dummy. 
Because the turnover rate in China is relatively low and its strong correlation with age, we 
do not control for work experience in the model.
6 
2.  Communist Party membership dummy,  i CP , equals 1 if an individual is a Communist 
Party member, and 0 otherwise. 
3.  Job Characteristics include the following. (1) Occupational status dummy  i OC . 
Occupational status is categorized into 11 segments including self-employed, enterprise 
                                                           
6 Even if we add the work experience variable, it does not influence the results. 
  11owner, professional, clerical staff, skilled workers, unskilled workers and so on. based on 
the questionnaire. We use the self-employed status as the base group with 10 occupation 
dummies. (2) Industry dummy  i I . From the questionnaire, we define 15 industry dummies 
with the base group of government, Party, and other non-profit agencies. 
4.  City dummy  i C . 
 
We need to point out that in the questionnaire, there are 12 ownership sectors, but in 
our paper, we reorganized these categories based on Knight and Yueh (2002) and Appleton et 
al. (2005) and the Chinese context. Specifically, SOE at central/provincial level, local SOE 
and state share-holding company are merged into a single state-owned sector. In addition, 
taking into account of the Chinese context, we add the government, Party, and other non-
profit agencies to SOE as a broader state-owned sector. The private sector contains the 
original private firm (including partnership), rural private enterprise and other share-holding 
companies, our self-employed sector includes the original self-employed and rural individual 
enterprise
7, and we combine foreign company and Sino–foreign joint venture into our foreign 
and joint venture sector. The remaining two sectors, namely urban collective and other 
ownership sectors, remain the same. 
Table 3 here 
Table 3 shows our empirical results. Our t-tests show that Party membership can 
generate a positive income premium in the state-owned, urban collective, private and self-
employed sectors. Specifically, the coefficient on Party membership in the state-owned sector 
is 0.07, the smallest among the above four. In the private and urban collective sectors it is 0.11 
and 0.29, respectively, and it is largest in the self-employed sector, up to 0.43. In the 
remaining two sectors this coefficient is insignificant, which might be attributed to small 
sample size. These results appear to support the conclusion in Knight and Yueh (2002), 
                                                           
7 A small number of urban residents are employed in rural enterprises. 
  12namely that the returns to Party membership differ by sector. In the market-oriented sectors, 
self-employed, private and urban collective, the returns to Party membership seem to be 
higher than their equivalents in the administrative sectors. 
As we mentioned before, if we simply partition the entire sample into the different 
ownership sectors, without showing whether the differences of the coefficient on Party 
membership among these sectors is significant, the results might not be convincing. Therefore, 
we add interaction terms to our model as follows. 
01 2 3 4 5 6
78 9
ln * * i i i i i i ii ii
ii i i
YX E D U C P O C P O E D U
OC I C u
O α ββ β ββ β
ββ β
=+ + + + + +
++ + +
 (2) 
In Equation (2), in addition to the control variables of Equation (1), we add an 
ownership sector dummy   (based on the questionnaire, we define six ownership sectors, 
namely state-owned, private, self-employed, foreign and joint venture, and other ownership 
sectors. We define five sector dummies with the state-owned sector the base group.), and the 
interaction term for Party membership and ownership sector, to see what difference, if any, 
Party membership makes in determining income in different ownership sectors. Since we 
divide the ownership sector into six groups with the state-owned sector the reference group, 
we construct five interaction terms, thus we interact Party membership with collective, private, 
self-employed, foreign and joint venture and other ownership sectors. If the coefficient on an 
interaction term is significant, it suggests that the role of Party membership does differ by 
sector, and not otherwise. We also define the interaction term    for years of 
education and ownership sector. 
i O
* i EDU Oi
i
Table 4 here 
Table 4 shows the results of Equation (2), and here we focus our discussion on Party 
membership   and its associated interaction term with ownership sector  . First, we 
can confirm the positive premium Party membership generates for earnings. On the 
i CP * i CP O
  13interaction of Party membership and ownership sector, Table 4 demonstrates that all the 
interaction terms in question are insignificant, indicating that there is no substantial difference 
between the contribution of Party membership among sectors. Next we conduct an F-test for 
the joint significance of interaction terms of Party membership and ownership sector. Our 
hypothesis is that the five interaction terms are jointly insignificant. The resulting F statistic is 
0.05 with a P value of 0.9988, which suggests that all the interaction terms are jointly 
insignificant and the rewards for Party membership do not vary across ownership sectors. 
From the above results we learn that the economic role of Party membership does not 
differ by ownership sector based on the 2002 cross-sectional data set. Here we measure the 
degree of marketization by different owner sectors, about which a feasible alternative is to 
compare the results in 2002 and 1995 under the assumption that there is a higher degree of 
marketization in the more recent year. If the returns to Party membership rise over time, it 
suggests marketization makes Party membership more valuable. Similarly, in the 1995 
function we control for individual characteristics  i X , ownership sector dummy O , i
8 industry 
sector dummy  i I , occupation sector dummy  , city dummy  , which denote the same as 
that in Equations (1) and (2). Again, in order to study how differently Party membership pays 
in these ownership sectors, we construct the Party membership dummy   and its interaction 
term with ownership sector  , as well as the interaction term of education and 
ownership sector   for Equation (3). Table 5 shows pertinent results. 
i OC i C
i CP
* i CP Oi
i
i O
* i EDU O
01 2 3 4 5 6
78 9
ln * * ii i i i i i i i
ii i i
YX E D U C P O C P O E D U
OC I C u
α ββ β ββ β
ββ β
=+ + + + + +
++ + +
. (3) 
                                                           
8 Based on the questionnaire in 1995, we combine the state-owned, at central or provincial level, and local 
publicly owned sectors together as a broad state-owned sector, while our collective sector is the integration of 
urban collective and township and village enterprise. In our sample, there are only three sample points for the 
township and village enterprise sector. Foreign company and Sino-foreign joint venture are merged, with the 
others remaining unchanged. 
 
  14From the 1995 results we found that Party membership enhances earned income, but the 
interaction terms for Party membership and ownership sector are all insignificant. Again, our 
F-test for the joint significance of the five interaction terms (F = 0.76 and P = 0.5762) 
indicates that the value of Party membership does not differ by ownership sector. On the other 
hand, the return to education displays significant variance among ownership sectors. To be 
more specific, the interactions of education and foreign and joint venture companies, private 
sector and urban collective sector are significantly positive, showing that education is more 
beneficial in these three sectors than in the state-owned sector. In the foreign and joint venture 
sector, there is a 4.6% return to each year of schooling while in the private sector it is 6%. If 
the reward for education is higher in the market-driven sectors, and Party membership does 
not pay more in the nonstate-owned sectors, then the above results can at least serve as side 
evidence that Party membership does not completely represent unobserved human capital 
(ability), otherwise, it should generate higher premiums in market-oriented sectors, as 
education does. 
Comparing our 1995 results with 2002, we find that although Party membership is 
generally valuable in both years, all the interactions of Party membership and ownership 
sectors are insignificant. The coefficient on Party membership is 0.093 in 1995 and 0.086 in 
2002. Does that mean that Party membership is more valuable in 1995 than in 2002? To 
explore this, we pool the data for the two years and establish Equation (4)
9, in which we add 
the year dummy   (1995 is the base year) and interact it with Party membership. In addition, 
education is also interacted with the year dummy and ownership sector, respectively, 
i Y
                                                           
9 Since the categories of occupation and industry are not exactly the same between the two years, we reorganize 
them for the pooled data. Specifically, for 1995, we combine the occupations owner of private or individual 
enterprise and owner and manager of private enterprise. For 2002, we combine the occupations owner (manager) 
of private firm and self-employed as a single sector, which is comparable to the above-mentioned term in 1995. 
For the category industry, we combine the two sectors of mineral and geological prospecting and irrigation 
administration, which is the counterpart of mining and geological survey and prospecting in 1995. The sectors 
electricity, gas and water supply facilities and real estate are brought together as comparable with real estate, 
public utilities, personal and consulting services in 1995. The other categories remain the same. Occupation is 
divided into 10 sections and industry into 14 sections in our pooled data. 
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   (4)    
Table 5 here 
In Table 5, we see that Party membership raises pay in both years, however, its 
interaction with the year dummy is not significant, which means that the reward for Party 
membership does not change over time. Furthermore, the insignificance of interactions 
between Party membership and ownership sectors suggests there are no differences across the 
labor market in the value of Party membership. Furthermore, the hypothesis that the 
interactions of Party membership and ownership sectors are jointly insignificant still cannot 
be rejected, given the following F-test (F = 0.06, P = 0.9974). By contrast, it is found that the 
rewards to education rise over time and the interaction of education and the foreign and joint 
venture sector is positive and significant. So no matter whether we use time or the different 
types of ownership seen between ownership sectors to measure marketization, we can see that 
the benefit of education goes with marketization, which is consistent with previous studies 
(Xing ， 2005; Zhang et al., 2005). In contrast, Party membership is not rewarded 
differentially by the marketization process, thus we can be more confident that Party 
membership cannot be fully interpreted as omitted human capital (ability). 
 
4.2 Differences between Ownership Sectors Concerning Returns to Social Networks 
As a nonmarket factor, social networks also play an economic role in the labor market. The 
reason social networks at the individual level may raise pay is that they give employed 
individuals access to labor market information. To save transactions costs, enterprises tend to 
recruit candidates recommended by existing employees who, to preserve their own reputation, 
refer only people they know well. Therefore, if a job seeker has an abundant social network, 
he is likely to have more job opportunities, which will in turn bring higher pay (Ioannides and 
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1995 CHIP survey, we establish the following model based on 2002 data. 
01 2 3 4 5 6 7
89 1 0
ln * * ii i i i i i i i i
ii i i
Y XE D UC POC P OE D U OS
OC I C u
i N α ββ β ββ β β
ββ β
=+ + + + + + +
++ + + (5)  
In Equation (5),  denotes a social network at the individual level, which we measure 
by the reported number of acquaintances from whom someone can seek help when he/she 
wants a job change. The other variables remain the same as in Equation (2). 
i SN
Table 6 shows the results of Equation (5). We find that even with the inclusion of social 
capital, Party membership, as a type of political status, still has significantly positive effects 
on income, whereas the interactions of Party membership and the ownership sector remain 
insignificant. Given the weak correlation between Party membership and social capital, 
controlling for social capital in the model does not affect the estimates for Party membership. 
Next we discuss the role of social capital. Unexpectedly, the coefficient on the social 
network itself is not significant. This suggests that a social network does not contribute to 
income, but does this apply equally to all parts of the labor market? To investigate whether 
social networks are rewarded differently in all sections of the labor market, we divide the 
overall sample into six sections according to ownership sector, and establish the interaction 
term   of social network and ownership sector. The ownership sector category stays 
unchanged, namely state-owned (base group), urban collective, private sector, self-employed, 
foreign and joint venture as well as the other sectors. The model is as follows. 
* i SN Oi
i N 01 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11
ln * *
*
ii i i i i i i i i
ii i i ii
Y XE D UC POC P OE D U OS
SN O OC I C u
α ββ β ββ β β
ββ β β
=+ + + + + + +
++ + + + (6) 
Table 6 here 
For comparison, Table 6 combines the results of Equations (5) and (6), the difference 
between which is only whether the equation contains an interaction term for social network 
and the ownership sector. It can be seen that despite an insignificant coefficient on social 
  17capital, all its interactions with ownership sectors are positive and significant. This implies 
that because, in Equation (6), the coefficient on social capital denotes the role of the social 
network in the base group, then this result suggests that the social network does not assist the 
base group. However, the interactions of the social network and ownership sectors are all 
positive and significant, indicating that the social network pays differently in the other four 
sectors compared to the base group. In other words, the social network can bring monetary 
returns to urban collective, private sector, self-employed, foreign and joint venture and others 
as well. Specifically, an additional contact can generate an income premium of around 4% in 
urban collective, private sector and foreign and joint venture, while in the self-employed 
sector the reward is up to 7%. However, we cannot rush to the conclusion that social networks 
are more valuable in market-oriented sectors simply because they pay more in market-
oriented sections of the labor market, because the benefit of social networks may not be 
directly translated into money; in some cases, they might take the form of gray income, which 
is extremely difficult to capture in the income function. 
In the traditional planned economy, social networks are critical to the allocation of 
resources. If an individual has a large number of helpful contacts, it is possible for that person 
to dominate the resource distribution. But because of a lack of market mechanisms, the value 
of social networks might not present itself in the form of monetary earnings. During the 
marketization process, the role of social networks may not be offset by the market system, 
which is filled with nonmarket power. Instead, the new market system realizes the return to 
social networks in monetary terms. 
In previous studies, Zhang et al. (2007) found that in rural China, marketization 
weakened the effects of household-level social capital on poverty reduction. A possible 
explanation for the difference between rural and urban areas is that, in the former case, social 
networks are formed in a conventional and closed society, and the market process generates a 
price mechanism distinct from the traditional allocation mechanism, which is conducive to 
  18expanding the scope of transactions, reducing social interaction in the traditional society as 
well as the returns to social networks. However, in urban China, the value of social networks 
is not transformed into earned income in the traditional state-owned sector. Beyond that, the 
new market system generated by the gradual marketization process is based on the original 
social structure, which is consequently embedded into the market system. As a result, this 
newly grown market system may raise the value of social networks.  
It is worth mentioning that, even if we control for social networks and their interactions 
with the ownership sector, the interactions of Party membership and the ownership sector are 
still insignificant. The F-test for the joint significance of the interactions associated with Party 
membership yield F = 0.07 and P = 0.9961. 
In Table 6, the regression on the right-hand side contains the social network and its 
associated interactions, which are found to be significant. Because the coefficients on the 
other variables remain largely unaffected by comparison with previous regressions, this result 
is the most comprehensive and covers all the variables with which we are concerned. Based 
on these results, we give a brief interpretation of our results for these other variables. (1) 
Personal characteristics, age and its square are significant and have opposite effects, showing 
an inverse U shape for the relationship between age and income. Income rises with age, but 
the opposite is true after the turning point of around 56. (2) Education raises pay significantly, 
implying the importance of education for earnings. In our estimates, an extra year of 
schooling can bring an income premium of 3.7%. From recent empirical studies, the return to 
education in China is still controversial. Based on micro data in 2000, Li and Heckman
（2004）found that there was an income premium of up to 11% to advanced education. Li et 
al. (2005b) used twin data and discovered that the return to education was 8.7% in OLS 
estimation, but it fell to 2.7% after the exclusion of fixed effects within twins. It seems that 
our estimate is similar to that in Li et al. (2005b), and it also indicates that if we control for 
more variables, the bias in the estimate of return to education in OLS is negligible, merely 1% 
  19higher than that in a fixed-effects model using twin data. (3) Regarding marital status, the 
coefficient of the married group is positive and significant with the base group of unmarried 
individuals, which means marriage can enhance earnings. (4) Ownership sector of a work unit 
also affects income. When focusing on coefficients on ownership sectors themselves, it 
appears that pay does not vary by ownership sector. However, since social networks are more 
important in nonstate-owned sectors, income in these sectors is actually higher than that in the 
state-owned sector, which is caused by social networks. Meanwhile, in the 1995 data, we see 
that education is more beneficial in nonstate-owned sectors, but when it comes to 2002, there 
is no remarkable difference in the return to education in all sectors, which might indicate an 
increasingly competitive labor market. (5) Occupation groups such as clerical/office staff, 
skilled worker, unskilled worker, sales clerk or service worker earn significantly less than the 
base group of self-employed, who are paid largely the same as the other groups of owner 
(manager) of private firm, professional, etc. (6) Only one industry, finance and insurance, has 
income significantly higher than the base group of government, Party, and other non-profit 
agencies, which earns more or less the same as all other groups. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the economic roles of political status and social network in 
the Chinese urban labor market based on the 1995 and 2002 CHIP surveys. Our main findings 
are as follows. 
(1) Party membership raises earnings in urban China. The income premium for Party 
membership does not vary by ownership sectors. Comparing the results in 2002 and 1995, 
we also found that Party members’ income premium did not change over time. 
(2) Social networks, as a form of social capital, also exert a positive effect on earnings. The 
effects of social networks on earnings between different ownership sectors suggest that 
social networks do not pay in the traditional state sector while they benefit nonstate-
  20  21
owned sectors significantly. 
If we assume that marketization deepens over time and that non-SOE sectors are more 
subject to market forces than their SOE counterparts, then our findings imply that whatever 
the time or the ownership sector, Party membership does not pay more as marketization 
proceeds. We have also shown that Party membership does not represent unobserved ability, 
otherwise it would be more valuable in more market-driven sectors. By contrast, we 
discovered that social networks assist nonstate-owned sectors more in the Chinese urban labor 
market. 
The establishment of the market system is a long-term process during which nonmarket 
power might penetrate the new market system and in turn influence market reform. In a 
market system with abundant nonmarket power, resource distribution will not be simply 
subject to the price mechanism, because the social interaction-based social capital will be 
embedded into the market system. As a result, how will the market system affect the price 
mechanism and resource allocation? Does nonmarket power harm social fairness? What does 
this mean for the future pathway to long-term economic development and transition to market 
institutions? These questions about the impact of nonmarket power on the market system and 
the transition process require serious thinking from economists. Reference 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Party Membership and Income in 2002 and 1995 



















State-owned   35.73  3672.75*** 27.81  2044.36*** 
Urban collective 18.66  2267.42*** 11.85  1372.06*** 
Private 18.99  2811.56*** 2.08 –3024.30 
Self-employed 6.82  1635.59  2.94  4531.02* 
Foreign and 
joint Venture  14.63 3658.43** 9.15 351.34 
Others 14.06  2476.93*** 7.46  977.29 
Total 28.58  3974.22*** 24.64  2086.25*** 
Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Social Capital and Income in 2002 
Ownership sector  Mean size of social 
capital (Headcount) 
Difference in mean income between 
the two comparison groups (Yuan) 
State-owned   1.27  717.42*** 
Collective 1.07  1843.82*** 
Private 1.25  1226.32** 
Self-employed 1.05  2043.70** 
Foreign and joint venture  1.63  1903.72* 
Others 1.10  3206.04*** 
Total 1.23  1250.95*** 
Notes: *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 3: Determinants of Income for Employed Individuals Partitioned into Ownership Sectors (2002) 
Panel A: Dependent Variables: Log of annual income 




effect  Standard error  Marginal 
effect  Standard error Marginal 
effect  Standard error
Male 0.129  (0.023)***  0.072  (0.070) 0.174  (0.052)*** 
Age  0.057  (0.011)***  –0.001  (0.036) 0.029 (0.020) 
Age squared  –0.001  (0.0001)***  –0.000 (0.0004)  –0.0003  (0.0003) 
Years of education  0.039  (0.005)***  –0.001  (0.015)  0.021  (0.011)** 
Married 0.249  (0.056)***  0.148 (0.186) 0.286  (0.104)*** 
Communist Party  0.072  (0.026)*** 0.287  (0.092)***  0.107 (0.067)* 
Other Party member  0.092  (0.089) 0.365  (0.400)  –0.003  (0.269) 
Number of 
observations  6492 625  1085 
Adjusted R
2 0.215  0.190 0.259 
 
Table 3:  Continued 
Panel B: Dependent Variables: Log of annual income 




effect  Standard error  Marginal 
effect  Standard error Marginal 
effect  Standard error
Male  0.221 (0.102)** 0.159 (0.110) 0.300  (0.102)*** 
Age  0.056 (0.043) 0.130  (0.052)**  0.029  (0.035) 
Age squared  –0.0006  (0.0005)  –0.001 (0.001)**  –0.0002 (0.0004) 
Years of education  0.048  (0.020)**  0.050 (0.022)** 0.019  (0.019) 
Married 0.169  (0.242)  –0.480  (0.189)**  0.170  (0.190) 
Communist Party  0.433  (0.204)** 0.152 (0.167) 0.054 (0.149) 
Other Party member  0.277  (0.576)  ––––  0.081  (0.600) 
Number of 
observations  571 202  999 
Adjusted R
2 0.233  0.372  0.069 
Notes:  (1) For brevity, we do not report dummy variables for occupation, ownership sector, and city. 
  (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
  (3) –––– denotes there is no observation in the sub-sample. 
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effect  Standard error Independent Variables  Marginal 
effect  Standard error
Male 0.158  (0.020)***  Interaction of Party membership 
and urban collective  –0.008 (0.099) 
Age 0.045  (0.009)***  Interaction of Party membership 
and private sector  0.026 (0.076) 
Age squared  –0.0004  (0.0001)***  Interaction of Party membership 
and self-employed sector  0.031 (0.156) 
Years of 
education  0.036 (0.005)***  Interaction of Party membership 
and foreign and joint venture  –0.042 (0.186) 
Married 0.228  (0.045)***  Interaction of Party membership 
and other ownership sectors  –0.005 (0.090) 
Communist Party  0.086  (0.027)***  Interaction of education and urban 
collective  –0.018 (0.015) 
Other Party 
member  0.104 (0.085)  Interaction of education and 
private sector  –0.003 (0.011) 
Urban collective  –0.012  (0.157)  Interaction of education and self-
employed sector  0.005 (0.015) 
Private 0.008  (0.124)  Interaction of education and 
foreign and joint venture  0.034 (0.024) 
Self-employed –0.193 (0.151)  Interaction of education and other 
ownership sectors  –0.013 (0.011) 
Foreign and joint 
Venture  –0.215 (0.296)  Constant  8.094  (0.208)*** 
Other ownership 
sectors  –0.059 (0.123)     
Number of 
observations  9974 Adjusted  R
2 0.218 
Notes:  (1) For brevity, we do not report dummy variables for occupation, ownership sector, and city. 
  (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Income (Cross-sectional Estimates for 1995 & Pooled Cross-sectional Estimates for 1995 
and 2002) 
Dependent Variables: Log of annual income 
  1995  1995 & 2002 
Independent variables  Marginal 
effect  Standard error Marginal 
effect  Standard error 
Male 0.127  (0.010)***  0.143  (0.011)*** 
Age 0.048  (0.004)***  0.047  (0.005)*** 
Age squared  –0.0005 (0.0000)***  –0.0005  (0.0001)*** 
Years of education  0.015  (0.002)***  0.012  (0.003)*** 
Married 0.266  (0.022)***  0.246  (0.024)*** 
Communist Party  0.093  (0.013)*** 0.084  (0.018)*** 
Year dummy (2002)      0.279  (0.112)*** 
Interaction of Party membership and year dummy     0.008  (0.024) 
Interaction of education and year dummy      0.029  (0.004)*** 
Urban  collective  –0.280 (0.049)*** –0.203  (0.062)*** 
Private  –0.701 (0.248)*** –0.056  (0.093) 
Self-employed –0.103  (0.142)  –0.147  (0.100) 
Foreign and joint venture  –0.330  (0.169)**  –0.246  (0.166) 
Other ownership sectors  –0.622 (0.192)*** –0.118  (0.089) 
Interaction of Party membership and urban 
collective  0.009 (0.038)  –0.007 (0.045) 
Interaction of Party membership and private 
sector  –0.705 (0.510)  0.007  (0.059) 
Interaction of Party membership and self-
employed sector  0.245 (0.227) 0.031  (0.114) 
Interaction of Party membership and foreign and 
joint venture  –0.027 (0.147) –0.048  (0.121) 
Interaction of Party membership and other 
ownership sectors  0.185 (0.229)  –0.014 (0.068) 
Interaction of education and urban collective 0.008  (0.005)*  0.001  (0.006) 
Interaction of education and private sector  0.060  (0.023)***  0.0001  (0.008) 
Interaction of education and self-employed sector 0.002  (0.016)  0.0005  (0.010) 
Interaction of education and foreign and joint 
venture  0.046 (0.015)*** 0.037  (0.014)*** 
Interaction of education and other ownership 
sectors  0.011 (0.019)  –0.012 (0.008) 
Constant 7.395  (0.085)***  7.453  (0.105)*** 
Number of observations  11599  21573 
Adjusted R
2 0.429  0.344 
Notes:  (1) For brevity, we do not report dummy variables of occupation, ownership sector, and city. 
  (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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Dependent Variables: Log of annual income 
Whether interactions of social network and 
ownership sector are inclusive  No Yes 
Independent variables  Marginal 
effect  Standard error Marginal 
effect  Standard error 
Male 0.158  (0.020)***  0.157  (0.020)*** 
Age 0.045  (0.009)***  0.044  (0.009)*** 
Age squared  –0.0004 (0.0001)***  –0.0004 (0.0001)*** 
Years of education  0.036  (0.005)***  0.037  (0.005)*** 
Married 0.229  (0.045)***  0.227  (0.045)*** 
Communist Party  0.086  (0.027)*** 0.087  (0.027)*** 
Other Party member  0.103  (0.085)  0.111  (0.085) 
Social network  0.006  (0.005)  –0.007  (0.006) 
Urban collective  –0.013  (0.157)  –0.031  (0.157) 
Private 0.006  (0.124)  –0.016  (0.125) 
Self-employed –0.195  (0.151)  –0.259  (0.152) 
Foreign and joint venture  –0.215  (0.296)  –0.236  (0.296) 
Other ownership sectors  –0.059 (0.123) –0.091  (0.123) 
Interaction of Party membership and urban 
collective  –0.010 (0.099) –0.020  (0.099) 
Interaction of Party membership and private 
sector  0.027 (0.076) 0.028  (0.076) 
Interaction of Party membership and self-
employed sector  0.031 (0.156) 0.035  (0.156) 
Interaction of Party membership and foreign 
and joint venture  –0.036 (0.186) –0.015  (0.187) 
Interaction of Party membership and other 
ownership sectors  –0.008 (0.090) –0.030  (0.090) 
Interaction of social network and urban 
collective     0.038  (0.023)* 
Interaction of social network and private 
sector     0.035  (0.017)** 
Interaction of social network and self-
employed sector     0.069  (0.025)*** 
Interaction of social network and foreign 
and joint venture     0.037  (0.023)* 
Interaction of social network and other 
ownership sectors     0.056  (0.017)*** 
Interaction of education and urban collective –0.018 (0.015) –0.020  (0.015) 
Interaction of education and private sector  –0.003  (0.011)  –0.005  (0.011) 
Interaction of education and self-employed 
sector  0.006 (0.015) 0.004  (0.015) 
Interaction of education and foreign and 
joint venture  0.034 (0.024) 0.031  (0.024) 
Interaction of education and other ownership 
sectors  –0.013 (0.011) –0.016  (0.011) 
Constant 8.089  (0.208)***  8.126  (0.208)*** 
Number of observations  9974  9974 
Adjusted R
2 0.218  0.219 
Notes:   (1) For brevity, we do not report dummy variables of occupation, ownership sector, and city. 
  (2) *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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